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Abstract
The sale of R&D projects through licensing facilitates the division of labor between research
and development activities. This vertical specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the
innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an R&D
project should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. We
show that in an environment where the seller is overconfident about the value of the project,
she may delay the sale to the more efficient firm in order to provide verifiable information
about its quality, though this delay implies higher total development costs for the project. We
obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of licensing and examine how factors such as the
intensity of competition between potential buyers influence it. We show that a wide array of
different explanations, based on differences in information, beliefs or risk profiles, lead to the
same qualitative results. We present empirical evidence from pharmaceutical licensing contracts
that is consistent with our theoretical predictions.
1 Introduction
Specialization in different phases of the innovative process is increasingly common in many indus-
tries, such as the pharmaceutical, chemical and semiconductor sectors (Arora et al. (2001)). This
division of labor, facilitated by the growth of licensing markets that allow for sale of projects, poten-
tially improves the efficiency of the innovative process. We argue in this paper that these efficiency
gains crucially depend on the timing of exchange, by which we mean the phase of development
at which the R&D project is transferred from one firm to another. Consider two firms, one more
efficient in conducting early stage research and the other more efficient in the final stage of product
development. It is socially optimal to have the relatively efficient firm own the project at each
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stage, i.e. to transfer the project to the second firm at the end of the initial stage. A delay in this
transfer increases the total cost of innovating, and might lead to the innovation being abandoned.
Thus, the timing of technology transfer is an important determinant of the innovation rate. We
identify factors that may distort the timing of the transfer and reduce the productivity of R&D in
a theoretical model, and provide empirical evidence consistent with the predictions. In particular,
we explore the relationship between market structure and the efficiency of markets for projects.
We explore several potential reasons that can generate delays in technology transfers. In the
main model, we consider the case where the seller is more confident than the buyers about the
prospects of the project. In this case, even though development is more costly for her, the seller
might want to delay the sale to allow for information to be revealed on the quality of the project,
since she is confident that the information will be in her favor. We show that in general, there is
a large number of explanations generating similar dynamics: the seller might be better informed
about the quality of the project or about some characteristic of the market, such as the number of
buyers competing for the purchase. There might also be differences in risk profiles between them.
All these different explanations will lead to the same qualitative results that we explain below.
We describe the baseline model based on overconfidence of the seller. We consider one innovator
and n potential buyers who compete on a downstream market. Prior to the first period, the
innovator has obtained a project that requires additional development to be brought to market.
While she faces some positive cost of development, development is costless for the buyers. It is thus
socially optimal to transfer the project from the innovator to one of the buyers in the first period.
In the first period, the value of the project is uncertain and the seller places a higher probability
that it is good than the buyers. Furthermore, development efforts from the first to the second
period reveal verifiable information that resolves all uncertainties about values.
We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient transfer of the project in the first
period. The key tradeoff is the following: because the price of the project in the first period
incorporates buyers’ uncertainty about its quality, the innovator, who is more confident that her
project is good, is tempted to wait for information about the project’s value to be revealed, at
which point she obtains a price that reflects its true quality. However, she must incur development
costs to provide such information. An agreement can therefore be reached in the first period only
if the efficiency advantage of buyers in the development stage is large enough compared to the
overconfidence difference between the seller and the buyers.
We find the result that when profits on the downstream market do not depend on the number of
buyers n, an increase in the number of buyers unambiguously delays the transfer. That is, counter
to the usual intuition on the positive role of competition, increased competition leads to increased
inefficiency in the market for projects. This is because an increase in n increases the bargaining
power of the innovator and the price she can negotiate in the second period. This increase is of
course valuable only if the project is good. Since the innovator is more confident that this is indeed
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the case, she is therefore more inclined to wait when n is large.
When profits on the downstream market also depend on n, an increase in the number of buyers
has two countervailing effects on the second period price: it increases the bargaining power of the
innovator, but it also decreases the downstream profits obtained from the innovation. That is, the
innovator obtains a larger slice of a smaller pie. In this case, we identify a condition such that
increased competition leads to earlier signing.
We also study a variant of the model in which we distinguish two types of potential buyers:
incumbents with existing products on the market and potential entrants without any stake. While
additional entrants affect competition for the innovation, the downstream profits an entrant realizes
from signing depend only on the number of incumbents. We show theoretically that delay in
the transfer is increasing in the number of entrants and typically decreasing in the number of
incumbents. This model will be the core of our empirical analysis.
As stated earlier, we find similar results for a wide variety of models discussed in section 4,
assuming various types of differences between the seller and the buyers. Most of them (except
differences in risk profiles) are based on the fact that information is revealed during the process and
that there are differences in information or beliefs. It is thus natural to think that the inefficiencies
we identify should be overcome using milestone payments. We find in the data that the use of
milestone payments is very limited and we develop a model, based on moral hazard concerns, that
provides a potential explanation and shows that inefficient delays may still exist with milestone
payments.
Our empirical analysis of licensing contracts in the pharmaceutical industry is consistent with
our theoretical predictions. This industry is a very good illustration of the process we described.
There is increasing division of innovative labor between small biotechnology firms and large phar-
maceutical companies. For instance, Angell (2004) claims that one third of the drugs marketed by
major pharmaceutical companies originate from licenses with biotechs or universities. Biotechnol-
ogy companies seem to have a comparative advantage in achieving early stage discoveries, while
large pharmaceutical firms are considered more efficient in conducting later stage clinical testing.
We argue that biotechnology firms are initially better informed about the quality of their drug can-
didates. However, verifiable information is revealed during the clinical trials that are required for
regulatory approval. Once a clinical trial phase is successfully completed, the information asym-
metry shrinks and potential buyers of a license become more confident of the drug candidate’s
value.
Figure 1 illustrates that in this industry, the fraction of licensing contracts signed after the
discovery and preclinical stages has increased by more than 30% since 1990, a period also charac-
terized by low numbers of new drugs launched. This delay in technology transfer also coincides
with a period of increased market concentration, as the pharmaceutical industry has experienced
substantial merger activity. This justifies our particular focus on the link between the number of
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Figure 1: Stage at licensing signing over time
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potential buyers and the timing of technology transfer.
We combine data on licensing deals and the stage of drug development at signing with data on
downstream competitors, who compete on the product market as well as for the license. Controlling
for various measures of financial constraints and other factors, we provide empirical evidence that
is consistent with our theoretical prediction for the relationship between competition and licens-
ing delay, though we do not attempt to establish a causal link. We also test the variant of the
theoretical model that distinguishes entrants from incumbents and again confirm the predictions
of the theoretical model across a range of specifications to evaluate robustness. We find that the
percentage change in the probability of late signing for a one-percent increase in the number of
incumbents is -0.31, and the corresponding figure for entrants is 0.17.
There is a large literature that examines different aspects of licensing contracts, such as the
choice between fixed fees and royalty rates, allocation of control rights, both theoretically and em-
pirically (Lerner & Merges (1998), Lerner & Malmendier (2005), Kamien & Tauman (1986), Beggs
(1992) and Choi (2001)).1 However, with the exception of Gans et al. (2008) and Luo (2011), the
timing of licensing has been ignored. Gans et al. (2008) describe several reasons for deviations from
1See also Anand & Khanna (2000), Vishwasrao (2006), Mendi (2005), and Higgins (2007).
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the socially optimal timing of technology transfer, including search costs, asymmetry of informa-
tion and uncertain property rights. They show that the resolution of uncertainty over the scope of
intellectual property (specifically, a clarification of the claims granted to a patent) speeds licensing.
Like Luo (2011), we focus on the asymmetry of information between buyer and seller as the key
friction in the market for projects, but we also examine the impact of market structure on timing.
We also show that assuming asymmetric information between seller and buyers, leads to similar
results. Much of the existing literature on technology transfers under asymmetric information
focuses on the case of weak or nonexistent intellectual property rights. In particular, Anton & Yao
(2002) examine the problem of an innovator revealing some information to convince a potential
buyer of the quality of her product under the risk that the buyer can then fully appropriate the
invention without any form of payments. We concentrate here on a different aspect. Property
rights do exist, but in order to convince a buyer of the project’s value, the innovator is forced to
incur development costs even when she has no comparative advantage in development.
Daley and Green (2011) consider a related issue: a seller is better informed than the potential
buyers about the value of the asset he wants to sell. At each point in time, he receives offers
from the buyers, and can accept of reject these offers. Information about the value of the asset
is gradually revealed to the buyers: the information asymmetry is thus reduced over time. This
reduction in information asymmetry has an ambiguous effect on the market efficiency: depending on
the buyers’ priors about the quality of the asset, information can either foster or reduce inefficient
delays in trade. Our setting differs from theirs along several dimensions. First, we focus on the
role of competition among the buyers, and in particular we consider the impact of competition on
buyer’s outside options, while they model the “market” as a set of short-lived buyers (they die at
each period and new buyers enter) with no strategic interactions. Furthermore, while they consider
a perfectly informed seller, ours can be imperfectly informed as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the baseline
model. In Section 3 we present the results on the timing of the transfer and discuss the effect of
market structure. In section 4, we show that a large class of models leads to the same qualitative
results. We then present empirical evidence coherent with our predictions: in section 5 we present
data an estimation approach and in section 6 we present the results. All the proofs can be found
in the appendix.
2 Model
We consider a model with one innovator holding a pre-existing project and facing n ≥ 2 other
firms. These n firms are the only potential buyers of the project, and do not themselves attempt
to innovate (for instance, because their cost of early stage innovation is very high). The project is
sold by running an auction described below. We consider only exclusive transfers that grant the
full ownership of the innovation to the buyer.
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The game has two periods that differ from each other in two important ways. First, at the
end of the first period, if the innovator has not sold the innovation, she needs to decide whether to
develop the product further. The potential buyers are assumed to be more efficient in development.
Development of the innovation from period 1 to period 2 costs ∆ for the innovator and zero for
the buyers. Second, period 1 is characterized by uncertainty about the value of the innovation.
The innovator believes the product is good with probability p while the potential buyers believe it
is good with probability q. We assume that the innovator is overconfident about the value of the
innovation, i.e. p > q (see Hayward et al. (2006), Galasso & Simcoe (2011), Malmendier & Tate
(2005), for a discussion of overconfidence). At the beginning of the second period, the value of
the innovation is revealed as a result of the verifiable evidence generated during the development
process, if development is pursued.
If the project is bad, we assume that it does not generate any profits. The profits obtained from
a good innovation are given by:
• pi0(n) is the profit of a buyer if neither he nor any of his competitors sign a license.
• pil(n) is the profit of a buyer if one of his competitors signs a license.
• pi(n) is the profit of a buyer if he signs a license.
We assume pi(n) ≥ pi0(n) ≥ pil(n) > 0. Each buyer wants to buy a good project, but should he
fail to do so, he prefers that no rival buys it either. We assume that all profit functions are weakly
decreasing in n and are continuously differentiable.
Buyers are heterogeneous. There is a fixed cost of production c that is drawn for each buyer
from a uniform distribution with support [0, c]. The fixed cost must be incurred after observing
the value of the invention (it will be paid only if the project is good). Specifically, the value to a
buyer of a bad project is 0, but pi(n)− c if the project is good.
The project is sold through a second price auction. The seller initially decides whether to run
the auction in the first period or pay the development cost ∆ and wait for the second period to
conduct the auction. Note that ∆ must be paid before the innovator learns the type of the project.2
Note that we obtain qualitatively equivalent results if we model the sale as a sequential bilateral
negotiation over fixed price contracts, rather than an auction Allain et al. (2011).
3 The timing of the sale of a project
In our model, it is socially optimal to transfer the project from the innovator to the buyer in the
first period, as development is costless for buyers. We show that overconfidence on the innovator’s
side can systematically delay the sale. Furthermore, market structure affects the timing of the
transfer.
2Equivalently, the innovator could run an auction with a reservation price in the first period.
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3.1 Equilibrium strategies
We start by characterizing the equilibrium strategies. We first show that the unique bidding
strategy for the buyers in both periods is to bid their expected value for the good, a standard result
in second price auctions.
Lemma 1 In the second period, if the innovation is good, buyer i with cost ci bids pi(n)−pil(n)−ci.
In the first period, if an auction is run, buyer i with cost ci bids q(pi(n)− pil(n)− ci).
Using the result of Lemma 1, we can derive the payoff the innovator can expect from running
an auction in the first or in the second period. If she runs it in the first period she expects a payoff
equal to the expected value of the second highest bid:
q (pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]) (1)
where E[cn2] is the expected value of the second lowest cost among the costs of the n bidders.
If she waits for the second period (and thus pays the development cost ∆), she expects a payoff
of:
p (pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2])−∆ (2)
This naturally leads to our first result:
Proposition 1 The unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is such that the project is sold in the first
period if and only if:
∆ ≥ (p− q) (pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]) (3)
As overconfidence p− q grows, it becomes more likely that the license is signed in the second period.
If this condition is satisfied, the socially optimal timing of licensing is achieved: the project
is sold in the first period and the more efficient buyer develops the innovation. However, if the
innovator is much more confident than the buyers of the prospects for the project or if the efficiency
difference ∆ between the innovator and the buyers is small, the threshold for early signature is more
difficult to meet and late (and inefficient) signature is more likely. The condition of Proposition
1 can be re-expressed as follows: a license is signed in the first period if and only if the cost of
development for the innovator is sufficiently large: ∆ ≥ ∆(n), where
∆(n) ≡ (p− q) (pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]) . (4)
In practice, deals vary in terms of the efficiency and overconfidence differences between the seller
and the buyers, so that some will satisfy the condition and reach an early agreement, while others
will delay. This tradeoff is relevant in practice if we are in the parameter space where ∆ is close to
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∆(n). To the best of our knowledge, no precise data exist on ∆ or p− q to make this judgement.
However, two facts lead us to believe that the tradeoff should be relevant in practice. First, we
show that the effect of the number of firms n on timing of the transfer, which we will derive below
and follows from this condition, is present in the data. Second, we expect a positive correlation
between ∆ and p− q: inexperienced biotechs will tend to have higher costs of conducting the trials
and to be more overconfident. This correlation makes it more likely that we stay at the frontier
where ∆ is close to ∆(n) when we study a diverse set of firms.
3.2 The effect of market structure
We now investigate how the number of buyers in the market n affects the condition of Proposition
1 and thus the timing of licensing. Specifically, we examine how ∆(n), which we call the efficiency
threshold, varies with n. If ∆(n) increases with n, delays in licensing become more likely as the
number of competitors increases.
3.2.1 Profits do not depend on n
The number of buyers may influence both the likelihood each individual player wins the auction
(it directly changes the number of bidders) but also the downstream profits. As a benchmark, we
begin with the case where the profits (pil, pi0, pi) do not depend on n. For example, an additional
competitor may not affect profits if innovations are purely market expanding and have no business
stealing effect. This case isolates the effect of n, the number of firms competing for the license, on
the price the innovator can extract. The following proposition states that the effect of n on the
timing of licensing is unambiguous in this case.
Proposition 2 If the payoffs on the market do not depend on n, the efficiency threshold increases
with n: the condition for early licensing is harder to meet as the number of buyers increases.
This result is intuitive. As n increases, the price the innovator can obtain in the auction
increases. Indeed, the expected value of the second lowest cost E[cn2] decreases mechanically as
more draws are taken from the distribution. Due to her overconfidence, the innovator perceives
higher benefits from waiting, while the cost ∆ remains unchanged. Thus, overall, an increase in n
will delay signature.
3.2.2 Profits depend on n
When the profits depend on n, the effect of a change in the number of competitors is more subtle.
There are two countervailing effects of n on the price the innovator can extract. On the one hand,
it raises the bargaining power of the innovator since there is a higher chance that one bidder has
a low implementation cost c. On the other hand, it decreases the actual profits derived from the
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innovation, since profits are a decreasing function of n. The tension between these two effects yields
an ambiguous effect of n on the price in the auction and thus on the timing of licensing.
To obtain precise predictions, more structure needs to be imposed. We assume that profits
decrease with n and are positive, a natural assumption in most models of competition. We then
obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 If pi
′
(n)− pi′l(n) < −2cn+1 , then the efficiency threshold decreases in n: the condition
for early licensing is easier to meet as the number of buyers increases.
The intuition of this result is the following. There are now two effects of an increase in n.
First, the value of second lowest bid increases because more draws of ci are taken. Given our
assumption that the costs are uniformly distributed, the speed at which E[cn2] decreases is given
by 2cn+1 . Second, the profits that the bidders expect decrease with n at a speed pi
′
(n)− pi′l(n), and
so the expected profits decrease for the seller as well. If the second effect dominates, early licensing
becomes more likely, since the seller has less incentive to wait. We show in the Appendix that this
condition is satisfied for a standard model of Bertrand competition with product differentiation
where the innovator introduces a new variety of product on the market.
3.2.3 Entrants and incumbents
Our previous analysis assumed that all potential buyers were identical except in their implemen-
tation cost. In reality, of course, the value of the project may differ across buyers for many other
reasons. In this section, we allow for an additional source of buyer heterogeneity, focusing on what
we view as a key difference between them: some potential buyers are active in the same class as
the licensed innovation, while others aren’t. Formally, we assume that there are n “incumbents”
denoted by i ∈ {1, ..., n} and e potential “entrants” denoted by j ∈ {1, ..., e}.3 Each entrant has a
fixed cost of production drawn from the same distribution as the incumbents’ costs, and the same
prior beliefs about the quality of the project. Entrants are not currently active on the downstream
market and get profits pie(n + 1) (which depend on n, but not on e) from buying the drug. Since
they have no current stake on the market, they receive zero if they fail to buy it. In contrast, an
incumbent receives pi(n) if he buys the license, pil(n + 1) if an entrant does and pil(n) if another
incumbent buys the license. In this context, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 All Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria in pure strategies have the following proper-
ties:
1. The efficiency threshold weakly increases with the number of entrants e (the condition for
early licensing is more difficult to meet).
3In the empirical section, we define entrants as firms with drugs in a larger related class but not the focal class,
and incumbents as those already producing in the particular class.
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2. If pie(n + 1) − c ≥ pi(n) − pil(n + 1), the efficiency threshold decreases with n (the condition
for early signing is easier to meet).
Proposition 4 puts together the two cases discussed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, and is the core of
our empirical analysis. The first result states that an increase in e unambiguously delays licensing.
This is in essence a reformulation of Proposition 2. An increase in e has no effect on the profits
of the winner, but has a direct positive effect on the winning bid since it increases the number of
bidders and means that more draws from the cost distribution are taken.
The second result corresponds to the case considered in section 3.2.2, since n affects both
the number of bidders and the expected profits on the market. The condition pie(n + 1) − c ≥
pi(n)−pil(n+1) guarantees that an entrant necessarily wins the auction4 and therefore implies that
the only effect of n is to decrease the profits on the market. Note that we can impose a weaker
condition (in the spirit of Proposition 3, for instance), but this formulation clearly highlights the
main forces at play.
3.3 Milestone payments
One obvious solution to solve the issue of inefficient timing of the transfer of an project is to sign
the contract in the first period based on a milestone payment that will be paid if and only if the
project turns out to be good. In this environment, without any kind of friction, the project should
always be transferred in the first period. However, less than 30% of the subset of licenses signed
between 1990 and 2011 for which we have some information on contract details included milestone
payments. Over time, this share has been relatively stable.
One natural explanation for the fact that milestone payment contracts are not widely used
is moral hazard. It is not possible to contract on everything: in the case of pharmaceuticals, it
is typically possible to contract on the results of the clinical trials but not necessarily on other
dimensions, such as development or marketing efforts. We show that in such situations, the seller
might still prefer to wait if he believes the buyers will not exert adequate effort.
We capture these concerns in the following modified version of our model. Suppose that the
final value of the product if it is good depends on the level of development effort exerted by its
owner (the bad quality drug still generates zero profits, irrespective of the effort). Specifically, if the
innovator does the development from period 1 to period 2 and pays development cost ∆H (resp.
0), the profits derived from a good innovation will be piH (resp. piL). The buyers still have an
advantage in development. They can develop a product of quality piH at cost ξH < ∆H , or obtain
piL for a zero cost of development. It is assumed that the milestone contracts can depend on the
state, good or bad, but not on the level of profits when the state is good, i.e the parties can not
contract on the level of pi ∈ {piL, piH).
4Even if he has the highest possible draw for the cost, an entrant still obtains a higher value from buying the
project than any incumbent
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The innovator chooses to either develop the product herself until the second period or to run
an auction in the first period, in which the buyers bid on a milestone-only contract. That is, the
winner of the auction pays his bid only if the project is good. In this situation, if the innovator
develops the product herself, she will exert high effort if:
ppiH −∆H > ppiL
On the other hand, there is the possibility of moral hazard. For a given bid, the buyer will exert
low effort if
qpiH − ξH < qpiL
So there is a parameter region where a tradeoff exists: if she does the development, the innovator
incurs a higher cost but obtains a higher value innovation, while if she runs an auction with a
milestone-only contract, the buyer will exert low effort. Overall, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 The innovator exerts high effort while a buyer exerts low effort if and only if:
∆H
p
< piH − piL < ξH
q
(5)
Furthermore, if this condition is satisfied, the license is signed in the second period.
Note that the difference in beliefs p and q is still key to our argument. We need to have a
significant gap between the two beliefs to have signature in the second period. Indeed, it is the
fact that the seller is overconfident about the value of the project that pushes her to invest more in
development than the buyers. If they had the same belief, given that the buyers are more efficient
in development, they would exert a higher development effort than the seller.
4 A robust effect of the number of buyers
4.1 The common thread
In this section, we consider a series of very different models, some based on asymmetric information
between the seller and the buyers, others on differences in risk profiles. We find the striking result
that all these different models reach the same conclusion as our benchmark model: a sale occurs in
the first period if and only if ∆ ≥ αr2(n), where
r2(n) ≡ (pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]) (6)
is the revenue the seller can expect if the auction is run in the second period. The factor that varies
across the different models is the value of α (for instance α = (p− q) in the baseline model). Since
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we will show that α is independent of n, the effect of the number of buyers on timing of sale is the
same as that described in section 3.2.
The important feature that all these models have in common is that there are two periods and in
the second period, all uncertainty is resolved. The condition then reflects the tradeoff faced by the
innovator: pay the extra development cost in the hope of extracting a higher revenue, proportional
to the second period revenue or sell the project immediately.
4.2 Asymmetric information about value
We first consider the case where the innovator is better informed about the value of the innovation.
We suppose the seller is perfectly informed of the value, while in period 1, the potential buyers
believe that it is good with probability q and bad with probability 1 − q. The quality of the
innovation is revealed at the beginning of period 2. The payoffs are otherwise the same as in the
main model and the innovator sells the good by running a second price auction.
This asymmetric information can be due to the fact that the innovator has greater familiar-
ity with her own project and its performance in laboratory experiments than would a potential
buyer. Indeed, asymmetric information is well-understood to be a characteristic of markets for
technology (Arrow (1971), Arora et al. (2001), Anton & Yao (2002)), and a number of empirical
papers have focused on how to address it. For example, Hegde (2013) examines how contracts are
structured (e.g., milestone payments and royalties) in biomedical licensing when “tacit” knowledge
or asymmetric information is important. Wuyts & Dutta (2008) show that social networks may
reduce the problem of information asymmetries, and Danzon et al. (2005) stress the importance of
experience as demonstrable evidence of an innovator’s quality. There is also compelling evidence
from the Licensing Foundation’s annual surveys of practitioners, in which 45% of the respondants
are in health-related fields. As Cockburn (2007) reports in his analysis of this survey data, “[t]hese
results suggest severe problems with inadequate data and asymmetric information....The critical
role of ex ante imperfect or asymmetric information is also indicated by the high rates at which
respondents cite revelation of new information about the end-user market or the performance of
the technology as reasons to revisit contract terms” (p. 10-11).
In such an environment, if in equilibrium the seller with a good type innovation sells in the first
period, she can only extract profits q(pi(n)−pil(n)−E[cn2]), since the buyer is unsure of the quality
of the drug. A seller who knows it has a good compound has an incentive to wait until the second
period for the quality to be revealed. However, waiting is costly since the higher development cost
∆ needs to be paid. The condition in the following proposition reflects this tradeoff:
Proposition 6 An innovator with a good project runs an auction, and thus sells the project, in
the first period if and only if
∆ ≥ (1− q)(pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2])
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4.3 Low type with valuable idea
Here we keep the asymmetric information framework developed in the previous subsection, and we
relax the assumption that a bad project has a zero value. We now assume that the profit obtained
from a good innovation is piH while that from a bad innovation is piL. Furthermore, we assume that
piL−pi0 ≥ 0, so that in period 2 a license will be signed with both types. We also assume that pil is
independent of the value of the innovation, which simplifies the calculations without affecting the
results. In the second period, the types are revealed as before.
Proposition 7 In equilibrium,
1. the low type always runs an auction in the first period;
2. the high type runs an auction in the second period if ∆ ≥ (piH −piL)(1− q), and otherwise the
high type runs an auction in the first period.
A pooling equilibrium where both types run an auction in the first period exists if ∆ is high.
Otherwise, there exists a separating equilibrium where only a bad type runs an auction in the first
period, while the good type prefers to delay the sale in order to reveal its type. Note that if the
bad type has a valuable idea, then it is always sold in equilibrium.
4.4 Asymmetric information about the number of buyers
The source of the asymmetric information between the seller and the buyers could be of a different
nature. Arora & Gambardella (2010) suggests there is uncertainty about the transaction process,
and the seller might be better informed about it than the buyers. For instance, the seller might
directly observe the number of buyers interested in her project, while the buyers are uncertain
about the number of competitors they face.5
To capture this idea, we consider the following model where there is no uncertainty about the
quality of the project (everyone knows it is good), but there is asymmetric information about the
number of buyers. The seller knows the number of buyers, but each buyer believes that he is the
only one with probability p, or that there are a total of n buyers with probability 1− p. In period
2, this information is revealed.
This is a signalling game in which the decision of whether or not to run an auction in the first
period conveys the innovator’s information about the number of buyers. In particular, if the seller
knows there is a single buyer, she will always run an auction in the first period since she cannot
extract any revenue in the second. The timing of licensing will be determined by whether there
exists a separating equilibrium in which, if she observes there are n buyers, the seller waits for
period 2.
5We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Proposition 8 There exists an equilibrium such that an innovator who knows there are n buyers
runs an auction, and thus sells the project, in the second period if
∆ ≤ (pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2])
The seller knows that if there are n buyers, she can extract revenues pi(n) − pil(n) − E[cn2] in
period 2, since the buyers bid their values. A separating equilibrium exists as long as this value is
greater than the cost of development.
Arora & Gambardella (2010) mention another potentially important idea. They cite a senior
executive of a leading pharmaceutical firm who mentioned the winner’s curse as a potential hurdle
to transactions in markets for technology. In a scenario like this, the buyers all have private
information about the value of the project, and underbid to avoid the winner’s curse. The seller
might then want to delay the sale so that information can be revealed. This provides an alternative
explanation for delay, although the role of n in the timing of sale is unclear.
4.5 Differences in risk profiles
We examine a final possibility that yields a similar effect of the number of buyers on timing. Suppose
the key difference between buyers and sellers is their risk profiles. In particular, we assume that
both the seller and the buyers share the same belief about the prospect of the project (it is good
with probability q), but differ in the way they discount payments obtained in the second period:6
the discount factor of the seller is δs, while the buyers share a common discount factor δb. In this
case we obtain the following result:
Proposition 9 An innovator with a good project runs an auction, and thus sells the project, in
the first period if and only if
∆ ≥ (δs − δb)(pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2])
Proposition 9 yields a similar condition as in our baseline case, except that the potential benefits
do not come from a difference in beliefs about the quality of the project, but rather from a difference
in risk profiles. However, a tradeoff only exists if δs > δb, which is unlikely to be the case if the
biotech is the seller and the big pharma firms are the buyers.
Thus far, we have made no mention of real options, now a widely adopted approach to internal
R&D management. The decision to develop a project from one phase to the next can be treated
as the purchase of an option. In this framework, the “sell side” is usually ignored, while it is an
integral feature of our model. In our context, a license contract involving an upfront payment with
development milestones could also be interpreted as the sale of an option on the technology.
6We have ignored discounting thus far.
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In a study of technology licensing contracts involving University of California inventions, Ziedo-
nis (2007) found that option contracts (rather than immediate licensing) were more likely to be used
when uncertainty about the underlying technology was high. The most likely purchasers of option
contracts in his study were firms better able to assess the technology. In addition, purchasers able
to absorb the knowledge underlying the technology had reduced incentives to license it after buying
the option. These results highlight both the potential for asymmetric information (as completely
uninformed firms are less likely to participate in the market for technology) and moral hazard.
Ziedonis (2007) notes that competition for a project might increase the cost of delay, i.e. decrease
the value of an early-stage option. Our model has slightly more subtle predictions for the effect of
competition, but is not inconsistent with the overall real options approach.
5 Bargaining with asymmetric information
In this section, we further investigate the robustness of the theoretical result by assuming that the
project is sold through a bargaining process instead of an auction. Consider that the project can be
transferred by signing a fixed price contract, determined by a bargaining process that we describe
below. To keep things tractable, we assume that the innovator knows the value of its project.
Once a contract is signed, the game ends: we consider only exclusive transfers that grant the full
ownership of the innovation to the buyer. The cost of production c is now zero: all potential
buyers are identical. If the quality of the innovation is known to be high, there are gains from
trade between the innovator and any buyer: if a license is sold, the aggregate profits of the two
negotiators, pi(n), are larger than their aggregate profit without sale, pi0(n).
7
5.1 A sequential bargaining framework
Bargaining between the innovator and the buyers takes place as follows. All buyers are randomly
ordered in a sequence. The innovator negotiates one by one with each buyer. We call each bilateral
negotiation between the innovator and an individual buyer a bargaining session. If bargaining
breaks down with the current buyer, the innovator starts a bargaining session with the next buyer
in the sequence. If bargaining succeeds, the game ends since licenses are exclusive.
As previously described, our model has two periods. If bargaining is unsuccessful with all
buyers in the first period, the innovator must wait for the second period to start another sequence
of negotiations. The order of bargaining is the same in the second period.8 If all bargaining
sessions fail, the players obtain their outside options. Within a period, the innovator cannot restart
7Note that we assume that the outside option of an innovator who has developed a good type innovation until the
second period and has not sold a license is zero: introducing a positive outside option would not qualitatively alter
our results (proof available upon request).
8Redrawing the order across periods does not qualitatively affect our results but complicates the exposition: proof
available upon request.
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negotiations with a buyer with whom bargaining previously broke down. To summarize, each period
involves at most n bargaining sessions, and the game overall contains at most 2n sessions.
The bilateral bargaining procedure inside a session is as follows. We assume that with prob-
ability , a bargaining session does not start. That is, a breakdown can occur even before the
start of a session.9 With probability 1 − , Nature draws one of the two players (each of them
with probability 1/2). The selected player then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to his partner. If
the offer is accepted, the game terminates. If it is rejected, the bargaining session ends, and the
innovator starts a new bargaining session with the next buyer in the sequence (if any).
The information structure is as follows. The innovator knows the value of its project, but the
buyers don’t. All n-buyers share the same prior that the innovation is good with probability q.
All players know n, and buyers know their positions in the sequence. However, the buyers cannot
observe the negotiations between the other buyers and the innovator. In particular, following
breakdown of a negotiation between the innovator and a particular buyer, buyers positioned later
in the sequence do not know the offers that were made and do not even know if a session ever
started with that buyer.
We focus on perfect bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. We solve the game by backward
induction. All the results are limit results as the probability of exogenous bargaining breakdown 
converges to zero.
5.2 The bargaining game
5.2.1 Bargaining in the second period
At the beginning of the second period, the type of the innovator’s idea is known to all. If it is bad,
no license is signed. The description that follows therefore focuses on the case where the innovation
is good. The following Proposition states that an agreement is reached with the first buyer in the
sequence, and shows that the price of the license is increasing in n: a larger number of buyers in
the sequence allows the innovator to extract a larger share of the surplus.
Proposition 10 If the innovation is good and bargaining failed in the first period, a license is sold
in the second period to the first buyer in the sequence.
• If the seller makes the offer, the price is p12S = pi(n)− pil(n) ;
• If the buyer makes the offer, the price is p12B = (pi(n)−pi0(n))2n−1 + (pi(n)− pil(n))(1− 12n−2 ).
If the innovation is bad, it is not sold at a positive price.
9The assumption that a breakdown may occur before the first round will prove essential to limit the multiplicity
of equilibria: see the Appendix.
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It is clear that the license will be signed with the first buyer in the sequence. First, assumption 1
(pi(n)−pi0(n) > 0) guarantees that there are gains from trade with the last buyer: should bargaining
fail with all the previous buyers, it will succeed with the last buyer in the sequence. Second, the
buyer positioned earlier in the sequence has even more incentive to sign, since he expects pil rather
than pi0 if he does not sign himself. He will thus pay a higher price for the license. Finally, we show
recursively that each buyer has to leave a higher rent to the buyer than the next potential buyer.
In equilibrium, the license is thus signed with the first buyer.
5.2.2 Bargaining in the first period
We denote by pg2 ≡ p
1
2B+p
1
2S
2 =
pi−pi0
2n +(pi−pil)(1− 12n−1 ). This price is the expected payoff of a good
type innovator before the first round of negotiations takes place in period 2. The expected payoff
of a bad type innovator in the same situation is zero.
Proposition 11 A license is sold in the first period to the first buyer in the sequence iff the
following condition is satisfied:
∆ ≥ ∆ˆ(n) ≡ pg2 − q(pi(n)− pil(n)) (7)
Again, the technology will be transferred early iff the development cost is sufficiently large,
that is, above a threshold ∆ˆ(n). When the profits do not depend on n, this threshold increases
in n:10 the condition for early licensing is harder to meet as the number of buyers increases. By
contrast, when the profits depend on n, the effect of n on the efficiency threshold is ambiguous.
If pi′(n) ≤ pi′l(n), then for sufficiently large values of n, the efficiency threshold decreases with
n.11 We show for instance in the Appendix that for a standard Cournot model with cost-reducing
innovation, the efficiency threshold has an inverted-U shape: it first increases, then decreases in n.
6 Empirical analysis
The results of our theoretical model are tested on data from the pharmaceutical industry. We do
not attempt to establish a causal link between market structure and the timing of transfer, but
rather to show that the link between these variables in the data is consistent with our model.
6.1 Background on the pharmaceutical industry
The pharmaceutical industry is very good illustration of the process we captured in our model.
There appears to be an increasing division of labor between small biotechnology firms and large
10The sign of ∂∆ˆ
∂n
is that of pi + pi0 − 2pil, which is positive by assumption.
11Proof available upon request
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pharmaceutical companies. In a 2006 survey of innovation, The Economist notes that “Big Pharma’s
R&D activity is now concentrated as much on identifying and doing deals with small, innovative
firms as it is on trying to discover its own blockbuster drugs” (Economist (2006)). Biotechnology
companies seem to have a comparative advantage in early stage discovery, while large pharmaceu-
tical firms are considered more efficient in conducting later stage clinical testing. For example,
they can exploit their relationships with medical practitioners who participate in running clinical
trials or prescribe their other products. They also may benefit from economies of scale and scope
in the administration of clinical trials. Drug candidates are usually sold with exclusive licensing
contracts.12
In two variants of our model, the seller has different beliefs or better information about the value
of the R%D project than the potential buyers. As discussed previously, the difference in their beliefs
could be a result of asymmetric information or overconfidence. The empirical literature attempting
to assess the extent of adverse selection in this industry obtains mixed results. Pisano (1997) finds
higher failure rates of drug candidates licensed in from biotechnology firms than those developed
in-house by pharmaceutical firms, suggesting a “lemons” problem, though Arora et al. (2004) find
the opposite. However, there is at least casual evidence that industry practitioners worry about
buying a lemon. We find it plausible that the licensing firm has some additional information about
the value of its drug candidate, even if considerable uncertainty exists. In particular, it may know
more about possible shortcomings: it may have internal information that suggests problems or
limitations, but that cannot be credibly disclosed. As discussed in 4.2, Cockburn (2007) present
survey evidence supporting this point.
The idea that entrepreneurs or innovators are overoptimistic has received more theoretical atten-
tion than empirical study. Lowe & Ziedonis (2006) found evidence consistent with entrepreneurial
overconfidence in a study of university technology transfer; in particular, entrepreneurs in their
sample were more likely to pursue failed development efforts than were more established firms. We
are not aware of any work that focuses specifically on overconfidence in biotechnology firms when
licensing. In a study of cancer drug candidates, Guedj & Scharfstein (2004) show that smaller
biotech firms are more likely to advance their projects from Phase I to Phase II than larger or more
experienced firms, but see higher failure rates later on. However, the authors interpret this pattern
as evidence of an agency problem between managers and shareholders rather than overconfidence.
In general, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about each party’s beliefs on the quality of a
licensed drug from ex post performance. Higher failure rates alone do not establish asymmetric
information or overconfidence, as both parties could agree that a project is high risk and agree on a
license price that reflects that risk. Without access to internal documents that include assessments
of risk, we cannot distinguish between information asymmetry and overconfidence. In our empirical
analysis (see section 7.2), we examine the effect of market structure in cases where the severity of
12Even though direct acquisitions of the company also occur, we will focus in the empirical analysis on the licensing
channel.
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asymmetric information may differ. Unfortunately, we lack a similar proxy for overconfidence.
The last important element of the model is that verifiable information is revealed during the
development process. Drug development involves several distinct phases which are clearly defined
and controlled by regulatory agencies such as the FDA in the United States or the European
Medicines Agency (EMA). During the discovery phase, firms identify drug candidates for further
development in targeting a disease or indication. These are tested in animal subjects during the
preclinical phase. At this point, clinical trials in humans begin. Phase I trials involve a small
number of healthy volunteers to establish a drug candidate’s safety. Phase II trials focus on the
efficacy of the drug candidate in treating patients with the disease and begin to identify side effects.
Phase III trials are much larger studies that continue to gather data on safety and efficacy. Verifiable
evidence of a drug candidate’s quality is produced at each phase and presented to the regulatory
agencies.
As we noted earlier, a number of alternative assumptions yield the same predicted effect of
market structure in our model.13 While we think the revelation of information from clinical trials
is of clear importance in this context, the existence of a different type of information asymmetry is
also possible: buyers might have superior knowledge of the downstream market and profit potential.
However, this type of asymmetry is unlikely to decrease as the product is developed, and so it is
unlikely to affect the timing of licensing.
6.2 Data
We draw our sample of licensing contracts from Recombinant Capital’s rDNA database. It con-
tains detailed information on all licensing deals in the pharmaceutical industry signed since 1973,
including financial details (total value, upfront and milestone payments, royalty rates) for a subset
of the agreements. It also provides information about the geographical region covered by the license
and about the type of contract (marketing, production, research). Finally, it records the phase of
development of the drug at the time the license was signed.
We do not model the choice of vertical integration vs. licensing, only the timing of a license
conditional on the signing of a contract. For small biotech firms, it is very rare to observe projects
developed without assistance from another firm at some point. In other words, we take it as given
that a small firm must license, and focus on when. If competition introduces sample selection
by affecting the likelihood that any license is signed, then our estimated coefficients should be
interpreted as applicable only to this subset.
Testing our theory requires us to identify a downstream market and the number of potential
licensees of an innovation. Since the rDNA database contains no information on potential licensees
or any other market level data, we exploit additional data sources called R&D Focus and MIDAS,
13For example, buyers may learn about the number of competing bidders for a project. We could not come up
with a convincing empirical test of this assumption, however.
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produced by IMS Health. MIDAS provides us with annual data on total revenues by disease from
15 countries from 1993-2007. The R&D Focus database tracks all drug candidates, or projects,
in development since the early 1990s. This source allows us to create measures of each firm’s
experience in drug development as well as in marketing approved products at the disease level.
We used a number of standard sources for firm-level information, such as VentureXpert, Com-
pustat, Osiris, and CorpTech. We identify whether each firm is publicly traded or privately held
and collect some financial data, where possible, such as the amount of venture capital financing.
Because many of the firms in our study are privately held and/or non US (roughly half are head-
quartered outside of the United States), our financial information is somewhat limited.
We restrict our analysis to contracts involving R&D on drug candidates that have not yet
been approved for launch, excluding co-marketing alliances. We focus on exclusive deals with no
geographic restriction, and on deals that are signed in the discovery, preclinical or clinical phases
of development. In order to match each deal to market-level variables for which we have data, we
include deals from 1990-2007. These exclusions reduce our sample of interest to 6,426 (including
observations for which the stage at signing is missing) from a total of 14,976 deals in ReCap. In
practice, this requires us to match each licensing agreement from the rDNA database with a project
in the R&D Focus database by hand using information on the partnering firms and the subject
of the license. In addition, we concentrate on deals that involve a specific drug candidate (or
candidates, in some cases) rather than those for the use of a technology platform (which are rarely
exclusive agreements). This process results in 2335 matches. We have the least success in matching
very early stage deals and those where the stage at signing is missing in the rDNA database.
Important for our definitions of potential buyer and downstream market is a drug’s Anatomical
Therapeutic Chemical classification (hereafter therapeutic class).14 Therapeutic classes correspond
to disease markets, and are coded at different levels of specificity. For example, the broadest level
is a single letter, such as group C for cardiovascular system therapies. C02 refers to the subgroup of
antihypertensive therapies, and C02A is the narrower set of centrally-acting antiadrenergic agents.
Drugs within a therapeutic class may be considered substitutes, but drugs within the same narrow
class are closer substitutes than those in the same broad class. Substitution is unlikely across
therapeutic classes. For example, “acne” (D10) is a separate market from “diabetes” (A10), and
human insulins (A10A) are closer substitutes than oral antidiabetics (A10B) in the treatment of
diabetes. We exclude the therapeutic class V7 (defined as “All other non-therapeutic products”)
because the set of products assigned to this class are not substitutes for each other.
14The World Health Organization describes this classification scheme as follows: “In the Anatomical Therapeutic
Chemical (ATC) classification system, the drugs are divided into different groups according to the organ or system on
which they act and their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Drugs are classified in groups at five
different levels. The drugs are divided into fourteen main groups (1st level), with one pharmacological/therapeutic
subgroup (2nd level). The 3rd and 4th levels are chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups and the 5th level
is the chemical substance. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th levels are often used to identify pharmacological subgroups when
that is considered more appropriate than therapeutic or chemical subgroups.”
20
Drug candidates are often assigned to multiple therapeutic classes because they can treat dif-
ferent diseases. In addition, most drug candidates have more than one firm listed as co-developers.
When counting the number of firms active in a therapeutic class, we consider all firms that are
involved in the development of a project, and we include all projects that are assigned to the ther-
apeutic class. Thus, our measures of the number of firms in a therapeutic class are very inclusive.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables in our analysis. We examine only
drug candidates that were licensed between 1990 and 2007, not the set of all drug candidates
that were ever (or are currently) available for licensing. Our estimates therefore apply only to a
selected sample. All variables are measured as of the date a license was signed. The definitions of
incumbents and entrants are described in section 7.3.
6.3 Empirical specification
While potential buyers vary in size, existing portfolios of products, and many other factors, the
empirical approach we adopt does not allow for buyer characteristics to enter except through our
definition of the set of potential buyers or classification as entrant/incumbent, which we discuss
below. Our focus is not on the identity of the buyer, but rather on the timing of the sale.
We begin by testing the model of section 3.2.3, which differentiates incumbents with stakes
on the markets and potential entrants. We use three empirical methods: logit, ordered logit and
a hazard rate model. The first approach defines an “early” stage of licensing (the discovery and
preclinical phases) and a “late” stage (Phase I, II and III trials). Testing involving human subjects
is more expensive and requires more complicated study design, and it is during these phases of
development that large, experienced firms probably have a comparative advantage. An alternative
is to treat each of these distinct phases as a “period” and assume that a similar trade-off exists
between signing in stage i and delaying until stage i+1 for each stage i; the difference is that rather
than disappearing completely, the informational asymmetry shrinks as each development stage is
completed. We can think of the condition for signing a license described in Proposition 1 as an
unobserved latent variable y∗. Two natural empirical models are the logit (for early vs. late) and
ordered logit (for each phase of development). Our latent regression is
y∗ = βN + γX + 
where N is a vector of competition measures and X is a vector of controls, described below.
The logit and ordered logit approaches have a number of appealing features. They correspond
very closely to our theoretical model, where the two periods differ in the information available to
the potential buyers. As a drug candidate progresses through each stage, verifiable information
about its quality is indeed revealed. This revelation exposes the innovator’s overconfidence, or
reduces the degree of asymmetric information. Another approach, similar to that taken by Gans
et al. (2008), is a hazard model in which a biotechnology firm’s innovation is “at risk” for licensing
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean StdDev Min Max
Late signing (post-preclinical) 2066 0.29 0.45 0.0 1.0
Log(months since start of preclinical) 1814 1.12 1.82 0.0 5.6
Licensor market experience (no. drugs mar-
keted)
2047 3.20 13.65 0.0 198.0
Licensor development experience (no. drugs
in development)
2047 6.38 16.44 0.0 302.0
Licensor deal experience (no. deals previously
signed)
2047 1.49 2.47 0.0 17.0
Licensor is publicly traded 2066 0.15 0.36 0.0 1.0
Licensor is based outside US 2066 0.42 0.49 0.0 1.0
Firms are co-located (same country of head-
quarters)
2066 0.42 0.49 0.0 1.0
Licensor is not in VentureXpert data 2047 0.49 0.50 0.0 1.0
Licensor’s round of venture financing 1026 3.69 2.68 1.0 20.0
Licensor’s funding in last round of venture fi-
nancing
1026 10.90 18.65 0.0 150.0
Licensor’s cumulative venture financing 1026 28.52 33.11 0.0 244.6
Licensor’s age 1048 8.23 5.60 0.0 20.0
Total revenues in therapeutic class (millions
of US$)
1672 4.27 4.77 0.0 30.6
Total venture funding for industry (units of
US$)
2065 9.15 4.23 0.0 16.7
Potential buyers 2047 42.40 27.73 0.0 113.0
Incumbents that sign at least one license 2047 22.78 19.95 0.0 80.0
Entrants that sign at least one license 2047 19.62 15.06 0.0 94.0
Incumbents, all firm types 2047 63.51 59.09 0.0 243.0
Entrants, all firm types 2047 35.92 33.87 0.0 230.0
Incumbents that are large and public 2047 8.13 5.09 0.0 20.0
Entrants that are large and public 2047 7.67 5.35 0.0 24.0
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from the time the drug candidate reaches the preclinical stage of development, and examine what
factors affect the hazard rate of the drug candidate’s transfer to a licensee. Since censoring is not
an issue in our data, we take the simplest approach and regress the natural log of the months
since a drug candidate entered the preclinical phase on the same variables as used in the ordered
logit. There is considerable heterogeneity in the time required to complete clinical trials; drugs for
chronic conditions may require longer trials than those for acute conditions, for example, and a
hazard model may confound the complexity of trials with the strategic delay that is our interest.
We exploit variation in the number of competitors across therapeutic classes, and within ther-
apeutic classes at different points in time, to identify the effect of market structure. Naturally, any
regression in which competition appears as an explanatory variable raises concerns about endo-
geneity. The regression model is derived from an equilibrium condition that accounts for the effect
of competition on profits. Given the entry barriers and lengthy development times required, the
number of competitors in a market is largely fixed in the short run; new entry reflects business
decisions taken years before, rather than an endogenous response to early or late-stage licensing.
The number of competitors also changes if a merger takes place, but it seems unlikely that mergers
between large firms are motivated by the timing of license contracts. Our main concern is the
existence of an omitted variable that is correlated with differences in competition between thera-
peutic classes and with the timing of licensing, which is testable only with a potential instrument
for competition. While it is not clear what such an omitted variable might be (additional controls
are discussed below), we lack good candidates to instrument for the number of competitors. No
major regulatory change affecting competition occurred during our sample period, and we have no
geographic variation in competition. Therefore, we interpret our results with caution.
While the the relationship between timing and competition is our main focus, we include a
number of controls that our model (and the existing literature) suggest should affect licensing
behavior. These include the extent to which a licensor faces capital constraints and various other
factors such as experience in licensing (measured as the number of previous licenses the biotech
firm has granted), experience in drug development (measured as the number of drug candidates the
licensing firm has previously initiated), market experience (measured as the number of drugs the
licensing firm has successfully launched). Because the availability of financing may vary over time,
we also include annual commitments by venture capitalists within the biotechnology and medical
industries. All specifications also include therapeutic class fixed effects, to control for differences
in demand as well as development costs or risks that are likely to vary by disease, and a control
for the size of the therapeutic class market, measured as total annual revenues from 15 countries
for drugs assigned to that therapeutic class. Standard errors are clustered by disease in all models
reported here.
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7 Results
The main challenge we face for our empirical exercise is to define a potential buyer. We argue that
firms with product market experience in the same disease area as the drug candidate for license
are the most likely buyers. Such firms have a good understanding of the market potential and
able to evaluate the scientific validity of a drug candidate available for license. In addition, these
firms have pre-existing relationships with doctors who treat the disease, who may enroll patients
in clinical trials as well as prescribe the drug once it is approved. In other words, these firms
should have relatively lower costs of conducting clinical trials and marketing the product, and the
highest expected profits from signing a license. We restrict the set of potential licensees of a drug
candidate to firms with existing products in the same broad disease area, or 2-digit ATC, as the
drug candidate licensed. For our baseline results, we focus on those firms that buy at least one
license; this essentially means that we don’t consider firms that mostly sell drug candidates (usually
small biotechs) as potential buyers of other drug candidates. Any definition of potential licensee
risks excluding some actual buyers and/or including some that are not true competitors for the
license. We therefore repeat the analysis using different definitions of potential buyers, and these
results are presented in section 7.3.
7.1 Entrants and incumbents
Potential buyers of a license may not be equally exposed to downstream competition and its coun-
tervailing effect on licensing delay. Firms that market a product in the same narrow disease area
are most affected by downstream competition, while those that are active in related diseases are less
so. We refer to the former as incumbents in the market, and the latter as potential entrants. We
estimate the model of section 3.2.3 that differentiates between incumbents and entrants, in which
we showed that the number of entrants unambiguously delays licensing. While the effect of the
number of incumbents is ambiguous, we showed that in general we should expect an increase in the
number of incumbents to reduce delays in licensing. We therefore use the number of entrants and
incumbents as the main explanatory variables in the following specifications. We expect a negative
coefficient on the number of incumbents and a positive coefficient on the number of entrants.
We define incumbents as firms with drugs in the same 3-digit ATC as the licensed drug, while
entrants are firms with drugs in the same 2-digit ATC as the licensed drug, but not in the same
3-digit ATC. Both definitions include only firms that buy at least one license in our data. The
results are presented in table 2; the specifications include all the additional explanatory variables
as in our baseline case, but we report only the coefficients for incumbents and entrants. Across all
specifications, the predictions of our theoretical model are confirmed: an increase in the number of
incumbents (resp. entrants) decreases (resp. increases) licensing delays. To assess the importance
of the effect of competition, we calculate the average elasticity of the probability of late signing
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with respect to incumbents and entrants. The percentage change in the probability of late signing
for a one-percent change in the number of incumbents is -0.31, and the corresponding figure for
entrants is 0.17.
7.2 Overconfidence and asymmetric information
In our model, the presence of asymmetric information or overconfidence are sources of inefficient
delay. While we cannot test for these directly or distinguish between them empirically, we try
to establish their relevance by testing our model on different sub-samples for which we expect
information asymmetries or the the innovator’s overconfidence to be high or low. Asymmetric
information and overconfidence are difficult to quantify, but we argue that they are likely to be
greatest in the case of licensors that have yet to establish themselves as capable of producing good
drug candidates or as trustworthy partners. Nicholson et al. (2005) show that these firms receive the
largest discount from new partners, for example, and cite deal experience as a means of signalling
quality. We therefore define “high asymmetry” licensors as those with fewer than 3 deals prior to
its current one; we obtain similar results using a definition based on development experience. An
alternative definition is based on a firm’s status as a public or private firm. Public firms are subject
to greater scrutiny and required by law to disclose specific information to shareholders. Therefore,
we might expect public licensors to have less private information as well as less subject to liquidity
constraints. We estimate our models using this split as well.
Table 3 indicates that our results are strongest for the subset of deals where asymmetric infor-
mation or overconfidence is likely to be high (we report only a subset of coefficients but include the
same set control variables as in the previous sets). Licensing agreements involving licensors with an
established history of partnerships do not yield statistically significant coefficients on competition.
Similarly, competition has a very small, although significant, effect on licensing agreements involv-
ing publicly traded licensors. We interpret these findings as additional support for our model: if
the effect of competition were the same in both high asymmetry and low asymmetry cases, this
would suggest that informational asymmetry and/or overconfidence are not underlying mechanisms
driving the timing of licensing.
7.3 Alternative definitions of potential buyers
An important concern in the empirical analysis is that our key variables of interest, those for buyer
competition, may be measured with error because we can’t observe for certain which firms may
have considered a license for a particular drug candidate. In this section, we explore alternative
definitions of potential buyers. Our previous definition was based on the argument that firms with
market experience in related areas would have the highest valuation for, and best ability to evaluate,
potential drug candidates. In her paper on licensing of biotechnology drugs, Levine (2007) defines
a potential buyer as any firm that markets a biotechnology product in the US, and allows their
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Table 2: Results with incumbents and entrants
Variable Logit O-logit Hazard
Intercept -1.9810** -1.4105** 0.1789
(0.5126) (0.4255) (0.4054)
Incumbents -0.0169** -0.0232** -0.0116**
(0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Entrants 0.0113** 0.0080** 0.0145**
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Total venture funding for industry 0.0194 0.0395** 0.0431**
(0.0218) (0.0183) (0.0183)
Total revenues in therapeutic class 0.0572** 0.0554** 0.0320**
(0.0147) (0.0127) (0.0129)
Licensor market experience 0.0063 -0.0029 0.0114
(0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0096)
Licensor development experience -0.0037 0.0071 -0.0118
(0.0107) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Licensor deal experience -0.0141 -0.0419** -0.0029
(0.0236) (0.0204) (0.0203)
Licensor is publicly traded 0.5598** 0.4871** 0.6930**
(0.1785) (0.1538) (0.1549)
Licensor is based outside US 0.0774 0.1635 0.0160
(0.1294) (0.1092) (0.1089)
Firms are co-located -0.5788** -0.4475** -0.4403**
(0.1289) (0.1070) (0.1045)
Licensor is not in VentureXpert data 0.4510** 0.5050** 0.4134**
(0.2077) (0.1733) (0.1665)
Licensor’s cumulative venture financing 0.0042 0.0050* -0.0025
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Licensor’s funding in last round of venture financing -0.0095 -0.0102** 0.0045
(0.0060) (0.0051) (0.0049)
Licensor’s round of venture financing -0.0153 -0.0077 0.0387
(0.0385) (0.0332) (0.0325)
Licensor’s age 0.0697** 0.0710** 0.0785**
(0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0138)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -926.4657 -2069.873 .095
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Table 3: Results comparing overconfidence/information asymmetry
Variable High asym. Low asym. Private Public
Incumbents
-0.0245** -0.0031 -0.0202** 0.0048**
(0.0059) (0.0112) (0.0056) (0.0000)
Entrants
0.0086* 0.0180* 0.0116** 0.0103**
(0.0045) (0.0109) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Number Obs 1254 379 1388 245
Log L -697.9432 -200.6718 -760.5830 -144.2832
valuation to depend on their experience in different disease areas. We consider non-US markets and
do not distinguish prior marketing of a biotechnology product from that of small molecule drugs,
but our previous definition also restricted the set of potential buyers to those that actually buy a
license at least once in our data. In this section, we consider two alternative definitions of potential
buyers to check the robustness of our findings.
First, we define incumbents and entrants as before except without the restriction that firms that
buy a license at least once in our data set. This set includes many firms that may not be seeking
to license in external drug candidates. For example, a small firm that co-developed a drug with a
much larger partner, but that has no marketing capabilities of its own, is counted as a potential
buyer under this definition. Table 4 presents the results from our three econometric models using
this alternative definition. We again find a negative and significant coefficient on the number of
incumbents and a positive and significant coefficient on the number of entrants. Second, we define
incumbents and entrants as in the previous section except that we restrict buyers to be large,
publicly traded firms (those we believe are most likely to have the necessary commercialization and
marketing skills). The results, presented in table 5, are weaker in terms of statistical significance,
though of the expected signs. Because most big firms are active in a large set of disease areas,
there is less variance in the number of potential buyers across therapeutic classes for us to identify
the effect of competition. As before, both tables report only the coefficients relevant to market
structure, but all specifications include the same control variables as the baseline case.
8 Conclusion
We analyze the effect of competition on the efficiency of markets for R&D projects. While normally
we expect competition to increase efficiency, one of the important conclusions from our model is that
competition has two countervailing effects on the efficiency of markets for projects. A decrease in
the number of incumbents or an increase in the number of entrants on the market may inefficiently
delay the licensing of an project.
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Table 4: Results with first alternative definition of potential buyers
Variable Logit O-logit Hazard
Incumbents
-0.0035** -0.0058** -0.0025*
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Entrants
0.0058** 0.0045** 0.0068**
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -927.4660 -2072.446 .095
Table 5: Results with second alternative definition of potential buyers
Variable Logit O-logit Hazard
Incumbents
-0.0254 -0.0496** -0.0031
(0.0211) (0.0177) (0.0175)
Entrants
0.0232* 0.0106 0.0337**
(0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0105)
Number Obs 1633 1633 1449
Log L or R2 -932.5247 -2081.531 .087
We present a model of auction that incorporates a number of elements that characterize markets
for projects in practice. Of particular importance is the uncertainty about the value of the innova-
tion that disappears with time. The seller is more confident than the buyers about the potential
value of the project. We are able to obtain testable predictions that are confirmed by our empirical
analysis. Our empirical results on the effect of competition on licensing delays are economically
significant.
The theoretical finding that competition has countervailing effects on delays in licensing appears
to be robust: we obtain similar results with a bargaining model and with an auction model. Though
the pharmaceutical industry is particularly well-suited for our application, our results should be
relevant in any industry where the division of labor in the innovative process exists, where early
stage innovators have better information on the quality of their innovation than later developers, and
where innovators face a higher cost of providing information about quality through the development
process than do potential buyers. One example of such an environment is university technology
transfer. Projects generated by faculty may be difficult to transfer because academic scientists
face a very high cost of proving their quality. They may lack the necessary equipment or staff to
produce verifiable information, in addition to having an orientation towards basic research.
Our model is not specifically designed to analyze the issue of mergers, but our results suggest
that merger reviews in highly technological areas should consider this additional effect of the merger
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on upstream licensing markets. The pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant consolida-
tion in recent decades, particularly between the large multinationals that are the typical buyers of
licenses. In addition, there is much concern regarding a slowdown of innovation in this industry
that the widespread use of licensing has failed to reverse. This paper highlights some frictions in
licensing and the role of competition that may at least partially explain these patterns.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Lemma 1
Second period: In the second period, the value of the innovation is known. If the innovation is
good, an auction is run. The unique equilibrium is such that all buyers bid exactly their valuation
(equilibrium bidding strategy in a second price auction). Thus in the second period, bidder i bids
pi(n)− pil(n)− ci.
The profit of the seller is:
p2(n) = pi(n)− pil(n)− cn2 (8)
and the profit of the buyer (with cost c) from winning the auction is:
cn2 − c+ pil(n) (9)
where cn2 is the second lowest cost among n draws of the cost parameter.
First period: we show that it is a dominant strategy for buyer i with cost ci to bid bi =
q(pi(n)− pil(n)− ci).
Case 1 bid bi is the highest bid. In that case bidding more does not affect the payoff. Bidding
less can make you lose and yield payoff qpil(n). Bidding bi yields payoff: q(pi(n)− ci)− bn2 (where
bn2 is the second highest bid). Since q(pi(n) − ci − pil(n)) > bi > bn2, this deviation decreases the
bidder’s payoff.
Case 1 bid bi is not the highest bid. Denote the highest bid b1 in that case. Bidding less than
b1 doesn’t change the outcome. Bidding more yields payoff q(pi(n) − ci) − b1. This is an optimal
deviation if b1 < q(pi(n)− ci − pil(n)). By definition of bi = q(pi(n)− ci − pil(n)), since bi < b1 this
cannot be an optimal deviation.
Proposition 2: the efficiency threshold is given by:
∆(n) = (p− q) (pi − pil − E[cn2]) . (10)
As E[cn2] is decreasing in n (the higher the number of draws, the lower the expected second lowest
cost), we have ∆
′
(n) > 0.
Proposition 3
∆(n) decreases in n if pi(n)− pil(n) decreases more than E[cn2]. We have
F2n(X) ≡ P (cn2 ≤ X) =
n∑
k=2
CknF (X)
k(1− F (X))n−k
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Hence the general formula of the 2nd order statistics of the distribution of c on [c, c]:
E[cn2] = c−
n∑
k=2
Ckn
∫ c
c
F (X)k(1− F (X))n−kdX
If we assume a uniform distribution of c on [0, c] then cn2 follows a Beta(2, n− 1) distribution;
then E[cn2] =
2c
n+1 . Then ∆(n) decreases in n iff pi
′(n)− pi′l(n) < −2c(n+1)2 .
The following example illustrates this case in a simple framework. Assume that n buyers initially
sell n symmetrically differentiated goods with a constant marginal cost c ∈ [0, 1]. They compete in
prices. Following Motta (2004), we derive a simple model of consumer preferences from Shubik &
Levithan (1980): the consumer’s utility is given by
U(q1, ..., qn) =
n∑
i=1
qi − n
2(1 + µ)
[
n∑
i=1
q2i +
µ
n
n
(
∑
i=1
qi)
2
]
where qi is the quantity of good i consumed and µ is the degree of product substitution between
the goods (µ ∈ [0,+∞]). The demand for each good is thus:
Di =
1
n
1− pi(1 + µ) + µ
n
n∑
j=1
pj
 .
The innovation allows the introduction of a new product. If no license is signed, the market is
composed of n symmetric firms with differentiated products. If one firm, say n, signs a license with
the (good) innovator, it introduces a new product. The competition game is now asymmetric, with
the licensee selling two of the existing (n+ 1) products.
The equilibrium of the pricing game yields the following profits:
pi = Πn =
(c− 1)2(1 + n+ µ(n− 1))(2 + µ+ 2n(1 + µ))2
2(1 + n)2(2− µ2 + n(1¯ + µ)(2 + µ))2
pil = Πi =
(c− 1)2(1 + n+ µn)3
(1 + n)2(2− µ2 + n(1¯ + µ)(2 + µ))2 for i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
Whenever c is such that developing the innovation is profitable for the buyer with the highest
cost (that is, pi − pil − c > 0), tedious but simple computation shows that the efficiency threshold
∆ decreases in n for all µ > 0, n > 2 and c ∈ [0, 1].15
Proposition 4: entrants and incumbents
Assume that, if the innovation is good, an entrant receives a profit pie(n + 1) if he buys the
license, while he receives a zero profit if he fails to buy it (irrespective of who buys it: he simply
15Computations available upon request.
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stays out of the market if he does not buy the license). An incumbent is assumed to receive pi(n) if
he buys the license, pil(n + 1) if an entrant buys the license, and pil(n) if another incumbent buys
the license.
We consider in turn the four possible cases:
• If (pi(n)−pil(n)− cn1 ≥)pi(n)−pil(n)− cn2 ≥ pie(n+ 1)− ce1, the two highest bidders (in each
period) are incumbents. In the second period, if the innovator runs an auction, each entrant
j bids pie(n+ 1)− cj , while each incumbent bids pi(n)− pil(n)− ci. Consider the first period.
If the innovator does not set up an auction, her expected gain is p(pi(n) − pil(n) − cn2) −∆.
If she sets up an auction in the first period, each entrant j bids q[pie(n+ 1)− cj ], while each
incumbent bids q[pi(n)− pil(n)− ci], and an incumbent wins the auction. The expected gain
for the seller is then q(pi(n)− pil(n)− cn2).
the condition for the innovator to run an auction in period 1 is then
∆ ≥ (p− q)(pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]),
which in independent on e.
• If pi(n)−pil(n)− cn1 ≥ pie(n+ 1)− ce1 ≥ pi(n)−pil(n)− cn2, in each period, the highest bidder
is an incumbent while the second-highest is an entrant; the condition for the innovator to run
an auction in period 1 is then
∆ ≥ (p− q)(pie(n+ 1)− E[ce1]),
which increases in e;
• If pie(n+ 1)− ce1 ≥ pi(n)− pil(n)− cn1 ≥ pie(n+ 1)− ce2, then
– either pie(n+ 1)− ce1 ≤ pi(n)− pil(n+ 1)− cn1, and, in any auction, an incumbent wins
and pays the second-highest bid pie(n+ 1)− ce1. The condition for the innovator to run
an auction in period 1 is then
∆ ≥ (p− q)(pie(n+ 1)− E[ce1]),
which increases in e;
– or pie(n + 1) − ce1 ≥ pi(n) − pil(n + 1) − cn1, and, in any auction, an entrant wins and
pays the second-highest bid pi(n) − pil(n + 1) − cn1. The condition for the innovator to
run an auction in period 1 is then
∆ ≥ (p− q)(pi(n)− pil(n+ 1)− cn1),
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which is independent on e.
• If, finally, pie(n + 1) − ce1 ≥ pie(n + 1) − ce2 ≥ pi(n) − pil(n) − cn1, in each period an entrant
wins the auction. Then
– either pie(n + 1) − ce2 ≤ pi(n) − pil(n + 1) − cn1, and the second highest bidder is an
incumbent. The condition for the innovator to run an auction in period 1 is then
∆ ≥ (p− q)(pi(n)− pil(n+ 1)− cn1),
which is independent on e;
– or pie(n+1)−ce2 ≥ pi(n)−pil(n+1)−cn1, and, in any auction, the second highest bidder
is an entrant. The condition for the innovator to run an auction in period 1 is then
∆ ≥ (p− q)(pie(n+ 1)− ce2),
which increases in e.
The following condition guarantees that an entrant wins the auction, and that the second-highest
bid is always from an entrant:
pie(n+ 1)− c ≥ pi(n)− pil(n+ 1),
under this condition, in both periods the price paid to the innovator is pie(n+ 1)− ce2. The seller
thus sets up an auction in the first period iff:
∆ ≥ ∆e(n) ≡ (p− q)(pie(n+ 1)− E[ce2]),
where E[ce2] is the expected value of the second-lower cost among e draws of the cost parameter.
∆e(n) increases in e as E[ce2] decreases in e, while ∆e decreases in n as pie(n+ 1) decreases in
n.
Proposition 5
Assume that condition 5 is satisfied: if the innovator develops the product herself, she exerts
high effort, but if a buyer develops the product, he exerts a low effort.
First, if an auction is run in period 2, each buyer i knows that the innovation is good and then
bids piH − pil − ci. If an auction is run in period 1, with a milestone payment, buyer i is ready to
pay the following tariff: piL − pil − ci if the innovation is good and 0 if it is bad.
Consider now the innovator’s choice in period 1. She can either wait until period 2, which
brings up an expected profit of p(piH − pil −E[cn2])−∆H , or run an auction now, which brings up
an expected payment of p(piL − pil − E[cn2]).
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The innovator thus waits for period 2 to run an auction if and only if:
ppiH −∆H ≥ ppiL,
which is satisfied under condition 5.
Proposition 6
In the second period, the type of the inventor is known, and the solution is the same as in
Proposition 1.
First period
We show that the unique equilibrium is such that a player with cost c bids his expected valuation
q[pi − pil − c].
We first note that, for a buyer with cost c, bids strictly above q[pi − pil − c] are dominated by
bids equal to zero. We eliminate such strategies. After elimination of these strategies, we show
that bidding exactly q[pi − pil − c] is a dominant strategy for a player with cost c. Consider a bid
b < q[pi − pil − c]. There are three cases to be considered:
Case 1 bid b is the highest bid. In that case bidding q[pi−pil− c] does not change the outcome
(outcome purely determined by the second highest bid).
Case 2 bid b is not the highest bid. We denote b1 the highest bid in that case. If b1 > q[pi−pil−c]
deviating to bidding q[pi − pil − c] has no effect. If b1 ≤ q[pi − pil − c], the expected profits if a bid
q[pi − pil − c] is made is q[pi − pil − c]− b1 ≥ 0. Thus bidding q[pi − pil − c] is preferable to bidding b
that gives zero profits.
In the first period the innovator has to decide whether or not to run an auction. Her expected
profit in an auction is q[pi − pil − E[cn2]]. If she decides to wait for the second period to conduct
the auction, she expects profits pi− pil−E[cn2]−∆ if she is a good type, and zero otherwise. Thus
a good innovator runs an auction in the first period if and only if
∆ ≥ (1− q)(pi − pil − E[cn2])
As ∆ is known by all potential buyers, running an auction in the first period if this condition
is not satisfied signals a bad type innovator, and no buyer bids a positive price: such a deviation is
therefore not profitable.
Proposition 8
In period 2, the buyers observe the actual number n of buyers. If an auction is run in period
2, and if n ≥ 2, each of them thus bids pi(n) − pil(n) − ci: the expected gain for the seller from
running an auction in period 2 is pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]−∆. By contrast, if n = 1, the buyer bids
0 in period 2 and the expected gain for the seller of running an auction in period 2 is −∆.
We claim that, if ∆ ≤ pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2], there exists a separating equilibrium where:
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• The seller runs an auction in period 2 if n ≥ 2;
• The seller runs an auction in period 1 if n = 1.
• If an auction is run in period 1, all buyers bid 0;
• If an auction is run in period 2, each buyer bids pi(n)− pil(n)− ci.
Assume that the seller follows the above strategy. Then if a buyer observes that an auction
is run in period 1, he believes he is the only possible buyer, and thus bids 0. All buyers do
the same and the license is sold at a zero price: the seller gains 0. If by contrast no auction
is run in period 1, in period 2 the real number of buyers is observed by all and the seller gains
pi(n)− pil(n)− E[cn2]−∆ > 0.
Consider a deviation by the seller, who runs an auction in period 1 although n ≥ 2. Given the
beliefs and strategy of the buyers’, the deviation yields a zero profit instead of a positive profit: it
is not profitable. Similarly, given the seller’s strategy, no deviation by a buyer is profitable. QED.
Proposition 9
In period 2, a buyer bids pi(n) − pil(n) − ci for a good idea, and 0 for a bad one. Consider
period 1. Waiting for period 2 to run an auction thus grants the seller an expected profit of
q[δs(pi − pil − E[cn2])−∆].
In period 1, by contrast each buyer is ready to pay qδb(pi−pil−E[cn2]) for the license. Running
an auction in period 1 thus grants the seller an expected profit qδb(pi − pil − E[cn2]).
So the seller runs an auction in period 1 iff:
∆ ≥ (δs − δb)(pi − pil − E[cn2])
Bargaining in the second period
Consider the case where the innovator has developed the idea, which happens to be good.
Assume that all negotiation have failed before the last sequence in the second period. Consider
the bargaining session with the last buyer. If a license is signed at a price p, the buyer receives
pi − p and the innovator p, whereas if the negotiation fails they respectively receive pi0 (as the
current negotiation is the last one, no license will be signed if it fails) and 0. By Assumption,
pi(n)− pi0(n) ≥ 0, and thus there is room for an agreement. The player that is drawn to make the
offer receives the whole surplus from the trade. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that, when
indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer, a firm accepts it. If the buyer makes the offer,
he offers pn2B = 0 and the seller accepts. If the seller makes the offer, he offers p
n
2S = pi(n)− pi0(n)
and the buyer accepts.
37
Consider now the previous negotiation rounds in the second period. We show the following
recursive property:
Pk: If the negotiation with the kth buyer starts (with k ≤ n−1), in the continuation equilibrium,
• Whenever the seller makes the offer, he offers a price pi(n)− pil(n) ;
• Whenever the buyer makes the offer, he offers a price pk2B = (pi(n)−pi0(n))2n−k + (pi(n)−pil(n))(1−
1
2n−k−1 ).
We first show this property for k = n− 1. Consider the negotiation between the innovator and
the buyer before last, assuming that all previous negotiations failed. When ε goes to zero, both
firms anticipate that if they do not sign, bargaining with the last buyer will succeed: (expected)
default options are thus pi(n)−pi0(n)2 for the seller and pil(n) for the buyer. Thus
• If the seller makes the offer, he offers a price pi(n)− pil(n), which leaves the buyer indifferent
between accepting a rejecting;
• If the buyer makes the offer, he offers pn−12B = (pi(n)−pi0(n))2 , which leaves the seller indifferent
between accepting and rejecting.
In each case, the offer is accepted. Therefore, property Pn−1 is correct.
Pk+1 ⇒ Pk : Consider the negotiation with the kth buyer. Because of property Pk+1, the buyer
and the innovator know that a license will be signed with the next buyer in the sequence, if they
fail to agree. The disagreement points are 12 [pi(n)−pil(n)+ (pi(n)−pi0(n))2n−k−1 +(pi(n)−pil(n))(1− 12n−k−2 )]
for the innovator and pil for the buyer. Thus
• If the seller makes the offer, he offers a price pi(n)− pil(n), which leaves the buyer indifferent
between accepting a rejecting;
• If the buyer makes the offer, he offers pk2B = (pi(n)−pi0(n))2n−k + (pi(n)− pil(n))(1− 12n−k−1 ), which
leaves the seller indifferent between accepting and rejecting.
In both cases the license is indeed signed. We have thus shown that Pk is correct.
The result stated in Proposition 1 is property Pk for k = 1.
Bargaining in the first period
Note first that if ∆ > pg2, then if no license is signed in the first period, the innovator does not
develop the product. Thus, when the innovator negotiates with the last buyer in the sequence in
period 1, her outside option is zero. Bargaining will therefore necessarily succeed in period 1. For
the rest of the proof we thus concentrate on the case ∆ < pg2.
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Step 1: If the condition of Proposition 2 is satisfied then, in all PBNE, a license is signed in
the first period
Suppose there exists a PBNE such that the license is signed in period 2. We know in period 2,
bargaining immediately succeeds if the innovation is good.
Consider the last bargaining session in period 1. As we are in a PBNE, beliefs are consistent on
the equilibrium path, therefore the buyer believes the technology is good with probability q. The
expected payoff of the seller if the negotiation breaks is thus pg2 −∆, while the expected payoff of
the last buyer in the sequence id qpil + (1− q)pi0.
If the buyer is drawn to make the offer, the minimum price he can offer such that the seller
accepts the offer is pn1B = p
g
2 − ∆. It leaves him with a profit higher than its outside option if
pn1B ≤ q(pi − pil), that is, if ∆ ≥ pg2 − q(pi − pil): this condition is satisfied by assumption therefore
if the buyer is drawn to make an offer, the last buyer in the sequence deviates in the first period
and a license is signed.
If the seller is drawn to make the offer, the highest price he can ask such that the buyer accepts
is pn1S = q(pi − pil). It leaves him with a profit higher than its outside option if pn1S ≥ pg2 −∆, that
is, if ∆ ≥ pg2− q(pi− pil): this condition is satisfied by assumption therefore if the seller is drawn to
make an offer, the last buyer in the sequence deviates in the first period and a license is signed.
There is therefore no PBNE where the license is signed in period 2 since we can always construct
a profitable deviation.
Step 2: If the condition of Proposition 2 is not satisfied then in all PBNE, the license is signed
in the second period
Consider a PBNE. Consider the last bargaining session in period 1 when the innovator has
negotiated with all but one buyer. Suppose the beliefs of the last buyer are that the innovator is
of a good type with probability q′.
First, in all equilibria, q′ = q. Indeed, given that there is an exogenous probability of breakdown
η before each session, a bargaining session between the innovator and the last buyer in the sequence
is on the equilibrium path regardless of the equilibrium. Therefore, the last buyer does not update
his beliefs based on the fact that the innovator comes to him.
If the innovator is drawn to make the offer, the highest price he can ask such that the buyer
accepts is pn1S = q(pi−pil). It leaves him with a profit higher than its outside option if pn1S ≥ pg2−∆,
that is, if ∆ ≥ pg2 − q′(pi − pil): this condition is not satisfied by assumption therefore if the seller
is drawn to make an offer, he does not make an acceptable offer to the last buyer in the sequence.
Similarly, if the buyer is drawn to make the offer, the lowest price he can offer such that the seller
accepts is pn1B = pp
g
2−∆. It leaves him with a profit higher than its outside option if pn1B ≤ q(pi−pil),
that is, if ∆ ≥ pg2 − q(pi− pil): this condition is not satisfied by assumption therefore if the buyer is
drawn to make an offer, the last buyer does not make an acceptable offer to the seller.
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Therefore if the condition of Proposition 2 is not satisfied, in any PBNE no license is signed in
the subgame where the innovator negotiates with the last buyer in the sequence. In any PBNE,
when the innovator bargains with the buyer who is the one before last in the random sequence, both
know that the negotiations will fail in the last round of negotiations in period 1. The continuation
values are then identical to those of the last and we find that the same condition applies to all
potential buyers but the first one in the sequence. The outside option of the first potential buyer
to negotiate is higher than that of his competitors, as he anticipates that he will be the one who
signs a license in the second period: he therefore has even less incentives to buy a license in the
first period than his competitors. Reasoning recursively we can conclude that if the condition is
not satisfied, no agreement can be reached in period 1.
Cost reducing innovation under Cournot competition
Assume that the n buyers initially produce a homogenous good at the same constant marginal
cost c. They compete in quantities and demand is assumed to be linear: D(p) = 1− p, where p is
the price of the good. The outcome of a good type innovation is a new process that reduces the
production cost to zero (a bad innovation does not modify the production cost). We also assume
that the innovator’s outside option is κ = 0.
The initial profits on the product market are pi0(n) =
(1−c)2
(n+1)2
. Signing a license for a good
innovation results in asymmetric competition, as the cost of the licensee is lower than that of his
competitors. If the innovation is good, the licensee thus receives pi(n) = (1+c(n−1))
2
(n+1)2
whereas his
competitors receive pil(n) =
(1−2c)2
(n+1)2
. Given these payoffs, Assumption 1 holds. Note that the
innovation is drastic and the licensee becomes a monopoly if c ≥ 12 . We only consider the more
interesting case where c < 12 .
We can show that the condition of Proposition 4, pi′(n) ≤ pi′l(n), is satisfied in this case.
Therefore, for large values of n, the efficiency threshold ∆(n) decreases in n (the condition for
signing a license is easier to meet). Straightforward comparative statics reveal that the threshold
decreases in q, and can even become negative for low values of n, in which case a license is always
signed in the first period. Figure 2 plots the threshold in the case c = 0.1 for several values of q.
The threshold has an inverted U-shape in n.
Proposition 7
In the second period, the type of the innovator is revealed. Buyer i bids piH −pil− ci for a good
innovation and piL − pil − ci for a bad one. In both cases, trade occurs. Therefore the expected
payoff of an innovator if he waits for period 2 to run an auction is piH − pil −E[cn2]−∆ for a good
innovator and piL − pil − E[cn2]−∆ for a bad one.
First, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of innovators run an auction in period
1 if and only if ∆ ≥ (piH − piL)(1− q). In such an equilibrium, buyers anticipate a good innovation
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Figure 2: Cournot c = 0.1
41
with probability q, so each of them bids qpiH + (1 − q)piL − pil − ci. The expected payoff of an
innovator if he runs an auction in period 1 is qpiH + (1− q)piL− pil −E[cn2] irrespective of its type.
It is profitable for a good type to deviate and wait for period 2 iff ∆ ≤ (piH − piL)(1 − q), while
this deviation is never profitable for a bad type. So there is an equilibrium where both types run
an auction in period 1 iff ∆ ≥ (piH − piL)(1− q).
Assume now that ∆ ≤ (piH − piL)(1− q). There exists a separating equilibrium where the bad
type runs an auction in period 1, while the good type waits for period 2. In this equilibrium, if an
auction is run in period 1, bidders revise their priors and believe that the innovator is bad. Each
buyer bids piL − pil − ci, and the expected payoff of the seller is thus piL − pil − E[cn2], which is
higher than the expected payoff of a bad type if he waits for period 2 to run the auction, but lower
for the high type.
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